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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MALCOLM N. McKINNON, 
Plaintiff-A ppellant, 
Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
THE CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
P ' Defendant-Respondent, 
Cross-Appellant, j 
Brief of Cross-Appellant and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
. Plaintiff-appellant, and cross-respondent seeks 
money damages against defendant-respondent, and 
cross-appellant arising out of respondent's alleged 
breach of contract to provide Appellant with a haulage 
right-of-way to reach coal properties formerally oper-
ated by Appellant. 
Case No. 
1 
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT 
Respondent moved the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Ernest F . Baldwin, 
Jr., presiding, for Summary Judgment. Said Motion 
was based upon several separate points. At the hearing, 
Appellant requested leave to file an Amended Com-
plaint for the purpose of adding or substituting new or 
additional parties defendant, and in addition, to include 
a new cause of action. The Court granted Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on three separate 
grounds, and further denied Appellant's Motions to 
amend his complaint. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON C R O S S - A P P E A L 
Defendant-Respondent, and Cross-Appellant con-
tends that its Motion for Summary Judgment should 
have been granted on the additional points presented to 
the lower court. Defendant-Respondent, and Cross-Ap-
pellant prays that this Court order that the lower court 
should have granted Summary Judgment on the follow-
ing grounds: 
1. That the preliminary negotiations between the 
parties did not constitute a binding contract. 
2. That the alleged contract is void for failure to 
comply with the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
2 
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S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
For many years Appellant was the owner of certain 
coal properties located in Emery County, State of Utah. 
Respondent is a Utah corporation sole. 
During the late 1950s Appellant approached Mr. 
Leonard F . Adams, Chairman of the Coal Committee 
of the General Church Welfare Committee concerning 
the possible purchase of the entire coal properties owned 
by Appellant. (McArthur Deposition, pg. 8) The pur-
chase of the entire property was never consumated, how-
ever, in February, 1959, a 480 parcel of the property 
being offered was purchased for the sum of $264,000.00. 
(McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D- l ) . 
Since only a portion of Appellant's property was 
purchased, Appellant proposed in a letter dated March 
17,1959, (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D-2), that he 
withdraw his application for a Bureau of Land Man-
agement lease for 640 acres of federal coal land, located 
immediately west of the original 480 acre plot which had 
been purchased. This was to enable the purchaser of the 
480 acre parcel to apply for a lease to the adjoining 
property. 
At about this time, Appellant expressed a concern 
about the existence of a fault lying within his property 
and running toward the federal land. He, therefore, 
suggested that if the fault were found to extend as far 
as the federal land, and if it became too expensive to 
cross through said fault, that he be granted a right-of-
way through a portion of the federal lease so as to permit 
3 
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him access to go around the fault and to continue his 
mining operations on the opposite side of the fault. (Mc-
Kinnon Deposition, pg. 10). 
Preliminary negotiations, conversations, and corre-
spondence relating to the granting of the alleged right-
of-way did take place. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibits 
D-2, D-3, D-4, D-9 and D-10, Exhibit A, pg. 7 and 8). 
No oral agreement was ever consumated between the 
parties, and no written document was ever prepared or 
signed by Respondent corporation, or by an agent there-
of, setting forth the terms of the alleged obligation to 
provide a right-of-way. Appellant himself has admitted 
that the negotiations were never consummated. (Exhibit 
A, pgs. 11 and 12; McKinnon Deposition, pg. 39). 
On June 18, 1959, Cooperative Security Corpora-
tion, a Utah corporation, by and through its President, 
Henry D. Moyle, made application with the United 
States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Man-
agement for a lease to the 640 acres of federal coal land. 
(Exhibit A, pg. 13). On March 1, 1962, said lease was 
granted by the Bureau of Land Management to Coop-
erative Security Corporation. (Exhibit A, pg. 18). 
On December 6, 1966, Cooperative Security Cor-
poration, the owner of the 480 acres, and also the lessee 
of the federal leased land, granted an option to Peabody 
Coal Company. (R. 102). Upon learning of such trans-
action, Appellant, for the first time in approximately six 
years, wrote a letter dated February 16,1967 addressed 
to the Frist Presidency of the Church, calling attention 
4 
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to the prior discussions and to the fact that such negotia-
tions had not been concluded. (Exhibit A, pg. 11). Sub-
sequent negotiations were then carried on in an attempt 
to resolve the matter, however, it was never resolved to 
the satisfaction of the Appellant. 
On June 1, 1968, Appellant granted an option of 
his property to the same Peabody Coal Company, which 
option was subsequently exercised by said company re-
sulting in a long term lease between Appellant and Pea-
body Coal Company, whereby Appellant is to receive a 
minimum of $3,000 per month until such time as he has 
received the total sum of $540,000.00, thereafter, the 
minimum would be the sum of $10,000.00 per year. (R. 
103). On April 12, 1972, the date the lawsuit was com-
menced, Appellant neither possessed nor operated the 
property upon which the fault existed, and therefore had 
no need for the right-of-way. 
A R G U M E N T ON CROSS-APPEAL 
P O I N T I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F A I L I N G 
TO G R A N T R E S P O N D E N T ' S MOTION F O R 
SUMMARY J U D G M E N T ON T H E GROUND 
T H A T A L L P R E L I M I N A R Y N E G O T I A -
TIONS CONCERNING T H E G R A N T I N G O F 
T H E R I G H T - O F - W A Y F A I L E D TO C R E A T E 
A B I N D I N G CONTRACT B E T W E E N T H E 
P A R T I E S . 
5 
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I t is a fundamental in the law of contracts that 
before an agreement may become valid, be it written 
or oral, that there must be a mutual assent to all of 
the terms of the contract, or a "meeting of the minds." 
The essential terms of the contract must be " . . . spelled 
out either expressly or impliedly with sufficient defii-
niteness to be enforced." Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 
61, 362 P 2d 427 (1961). In an earlier case entitled 
Price v, Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 Pac. 767 (1906), being 
an action to compel specific performance of a parol 
agreement, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
This contract must be complete and certain in its 
terms; and 'this element of completeness' must 
exist in every contract which can be specifically 
enforced, whatever be its external form whether 
written or verbal, whether embodied in the memo-
randum required by the Statute of Frauds, or 
rendered obligatory by part performance, or by 
any other act which may obviate the provisions of 
that statute. 
In addition, the burden of proving such assent and 
definiteness of terms lies upon the party who claims 
the existence of a contract. B. & R. Supply Company 
v. Bringkurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P 2d 1216, (1972). 
In the case at bar, Appellant has attempted to 
establish the existence of a valid contract, claiming 
that several documents read collectively constitute a 
binding contract or obligation to grant a right-of-way. 
A summary of the documents relied upon by the Appel-
lant are as follows: 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. A letter dated March 12, 1959 from Mr. 
Leonard Adams of the General Church Wel-
fare Committee to the Appellant. (Exhibit 
A,pg.l). 
There is no mention in this letter concerning 
the granting of a right-of-way. 
2. A letter dated March 17, 1959 from Appel-
lant to Mr. Leonard Adams of the General 
Church Welfare Committee. (McKinnon 
Deposition, Exhibit D-2). 
The letter states as follows: 
I would like to present a proposition, wherein 
the Church applies for the acreage I asked for 
in my lease modification, along with other 
acreage suitable to Church use, and after the 
lease is granted, assigns to me a portion of the 
land I applied for in my lease modification. I 
need a portion of this land in order to develop 
a practical haulageway to the west that will 
go around the fault that is running in a south-
westerly direction and could cut me off if I do 
not have some additional land to the south. 
(Emphasis added.) 
3. A letter dated April 15, 1959 from Leonard 
E. Adams to Henry D. Moyle. The letter 
reads in part as follows: 
Should be pleased to discuss this matter 
(right-of-way) with you with view to deter-
mining whether or not the Church could con-
sistently grant the American Fuel Company 
access to any of the Government Land which 
the Church expects to lease from the Govern-
ment provided it was necessary for the Amer-
7 
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ican Fuel Company to have access to such 
acreage. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D-
5). 
4. A letter from Frank Armstrong, Appellant's 
attorney dated January 6, 1960 to Henry D, 
Moyle, states as follows: 
I talked to you some time ago just prior to the 
death of Leonard E. Adams regarding an 
appointment to meet with Brother Adams 
and Malcolm N. McKinnon to arrange the 
granting of a right-of-way to Mr. McKinnon 
over a portion of the land the Church was ob-
taining by lease from the Federal govern-
ment and to arrange for a contribution to the 
church out of the money to be paid Mr. Mc-
Kinnon for a portion of his mine. (Emphasis 
added.) (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D-
9). 
5. A letter dated February 8,1961 from Appel-
lant to Henry D. Moyle which states as fol-
lows : 
While there is no immediate rush to conclude 
this matter, I have been holding a sizeable 
donation for the Church. I want to turn this 
over to you at the time you give me a letter 
stating that: In the event I should require ad-
ditional land to make it possible to go around 
the end of the faults that might otherwise pre-
vent me from being able to extract the coal 
from land lying west of the faults, the Church 
would agree to make it available. This is in 
accord with the understanding you had with 
Mr. Armstrong. (Emphasis added.) (Ex-
hibit A, pg. 8) . 
8 
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6. A letter dated November 30, 1961 from Ap-
pellant's attorney to Henry D. Moyle states 
as follows: 
When Malcolm N. McKinnon sold a part of 
his mine to the Church, I talked to you about 
a right-of-way to get into some of his leased 
property if, because of faults, he couldn't get 
to it from his present workings. 
7. An envelop containing two checks, totalling 
$14,000.00 from Appellant payable to The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
Said checks were to be held until negotiations 
for right-of-way were completed. These 
checks have never been cashed. (McKinnon's 
Deposition Exhibits D-3 and D-4) Written 
upon envelop was the following: 
"Hold: Two checks totalling $14,000.00. 
Malcolm McKinnon tendered for right-of-
way. This matter is pending." (R. 99). 
8. A letter dated September 17, 1969 from Al-
fred W. Uhrhan to the Appellant. Part of the 
letter reads as follows: 
The two checks were handed to me personally 
by the late President Moyle with the instruc-
tions to hold them until the details of the 
right-of-way were worked out with the mine 
management. . . . At that time, Brother 
Leonard E. Adams was still alive and in 
charge of the mine. However, he was ailing, 
and it is obvious that the matter was not final-
ized at that time. (Emphasis added.) (Ex-
hibit A, pg. 7). 
9 
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According to Appellant's own admission, the fore-
going enumerated documents constitute all of the 
documents relied upon by the Appellant to show the 
existence of a contract requiring Respondent to convey 
a right-of-way. (R. 98 & 99). I t is obvious from a 
review of these documents that there is no "meeting 
of the minds." The only assumption which may be 
gleaned therefrom is that preliminary negotiations on 
the possible granting of a right-of-way were held. This 
court held in Valcarce, supra at page 428 " . . . that where 
there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that 
a contract might be entered into in the future, the court 
cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought 
to have made and enforce it." 
A collective reading of all of the documents relied 
upon by the Appellant fail to mention the location, 
nature, extent or duration of the proposed right-of-way. 
There are no documents which were prepared by either 
Appellant or Respondent, or their agents which indicate 
that Appellant in fact agreed to or consented to the 
terms of a purported right-of-way. 
Appellant, in his deposition on the 28th day of 
June, 1972, himself admitted that the negotiations were 
never consummated. He states beginning on Page 39 as 
follows: 
Well, let's say prior to the time that you leased to 
Peabody Coal Company we were waiting for you 
to give us in writing something to establish the 
fact that we were to have the right to go around. 
. . . (Emphasis Added.) 
10 
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I t was to be a donation to be held and not cashed 
until such time as the leases could be issued and 
some written document given to me assuring me 
that if the faults extended into your property, I 
could go into your property far enough with my 
entries to go around the end of the fault. . . . 
Q. I see. And if we did not give you the written 
document, we were not to cash the checks ? 
A. If I didn't get the written documents, you 
weren't to cash the checks. (Pages 40-41). 
A. If they had given me a letter stating that I 
could go if I needed it, Yes. 
Q. But if they failed or refused to give you that 
letter, they were not entitled to the $14,000.00? 
A. No. (Page 42). 
The checks were never cashed. 
I t is clear that at the end of the negotiations, there 
was, at best, an agreement to make a contract at some 
future date, pending the satisfactory negotiation of 
additional terms of the contract. An agreement to agree 
at a future date does not constitute a contract, and to 
so hold would be in contravention of long standing 
precedents in this and other jurisdictions. Hi-Way 
Motor Co. v. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65, 249 Pac. 
133 (1926); Slayter v. Palsey, 199 Ore. 616, 264 P2d 
444 (1953); Western Airlines, Inc. v. Lathrop Com-
pany, 499 P2d 1013, (Alaska 1972). 
The applicable law in this case is, therefore, clear: 
That where there are mere negotiations moving toward 
the making of a contract, and where there is no evi-
11 
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dence of an actual ' 'meeting of the minds" as to the 
essential and material terms of the contract, there is no 
contract between the parties. 
Based upon these facts, the lower court should 
have held that there was no binding contract in exist-
ence, and properly should have granted Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on that basis. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N F A I L I N G 
TO GRANT R E S P O N D E N T ' S MOTION F O R 
SUMMARY J U D G M E N T ON T H E G R O U N D 
T H A T T H E A L L E G E D CONTRACT F A I L E D 
TO COMPLY W I T H T H E U T A H S T A T U T E 
O F FRAUDS. 
A. AN ORAL A G R E E M E N T F O R T H E 
G R A N T I N G OF A R I G H T - O F - W A Y TO L A N D 
I S VOID. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds renders all oral execu-
tory agreements for the sale of an interest in land void. 
Section 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
L E A S E S AND CONTRACTS F O R IN-
T E R E S T I N L A N D S : Every contract for the 
leasing for a longer period than one year, or for 
the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, 
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
12 
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the party b\ w Ji*»i>• (he lease IT -*.oe I> J- • -e made, 
or by his lawiol ;i^'itl thereunto authorized in 
writ in ir. 
Ii. 1971, the Utah Supreme Com' U>. JFcIh r, 
Marc us, 25 Utah 2d 242, 480 P ;M UMi , 1**7 1 >. de-
fined "any interest in lands" for purpose of applying 
the Statute of Frauds to include the right to run a pipe-
line <»wr n,r ii,:*! ..f another. This affirms the rule of 
i::\* adapted h\ Uu jurisdictions which previously 
defined "interest •-.;. trM*Ju«K- easements and 
specifically rights-of-way. tSij/mnsi^ 1/ Duiitrfrf, 
.-::t. DOC :UMENfJ6 lU^lUJJ UPON 
TO TAKI TDK CASE OUT OF THE STAT-
UTE OF FRAUDS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO 
CONSTITI JTE A k M E M O R A N D I JM I N W R I T -
I N G . " 
'"V U4-"!; SlaiuN of F -n id , PM ides that
 a oni-
tract lor an interest in land is vuiil unless evidenced by 
a " . . . note or memorandum thereof '« criling 
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is 
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
!. writing." Utah Code Annotated, Serf ion •>•>-% :i 
1D.VJ. 
The Utah Supreme (<•>;»{ -MS . : . . ^ I M-HI-M-U 
that the n«'i< or memoranrunt rehed upon to establish 
. ;!Ui! agrenncni u-- diffidently definite so as to 
establish the terms of the agreement, n d n addition, 
U:-:M contain all the '-sxonlial terms and provision^ A 
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the contract. Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refinery Co., 121 
Utah 412, 242 P2d 578, (1952); Collett v. Goodrich, 
119 Utah 662, 231 P 2d 730 (1951). 
Not one of the documents relied upon by the Ap-
pellant in the matter before the court bear the signature 
of the Corporation of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, nor any authorized 
agent thereof. In fact there are no documents which 
constitute an agreement, which have been signed by 
any agent of any Church entity. Accordingly, the pro-
visions of the Utah Statute of Frauds have not been 
complied with, and the purported contract should be 
held to be void. 
The lower court should have held that the purport-
ed contract between the parties was void for not having 
complied with the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
R E S P O N D E N T S A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT W A S CORRECT I N 
G R A N T I N G R E S P O N D E N T ' S MOTION F O R 
SUMMARY J U D G M E N T ON T H E GROUND 
T H A T A P P E L L A N T W A S S U I N G T H E 
W R O N G D E F E N D A N T . 
The Appellant contends that the Corporation of 
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints is the proper defendant in this action. Re-
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spouflrm i !;iiin- -n u di^ !<.\wr eoi.-i. found that said 
corporation - t.nf M I : ?H * defendant, rather the 
Cooperative Si**-urit\ Corporation should have been 
named as ^n- pmp< \ defendant. 
Tin i'iirp'M-.'iiMMi of the Preside) ' . (:., n i u m . 
•>\ J.-^Jis i lii-isi .-.j" Lat ter-Day Saints is A l7tah corpo-
ration <oh organized ,nd existing pu:>uant to the 
provision*- I' Section M* : i Mirough 11, inclusive, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, a^  amended ^ueli corporation, 
as a corporation sole, consists of one individual namely, 
the President »>f ih" n^v-ch of Jesus Christ ..* L.-Mter-
D a y Saints. 
Anp^M .\:i lias stated in h'* Hru f* :h, i . ;] ontacts 
during the formation of the purported agreement were 
with representatives, agents, or employees of the Cor-
poration of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Lat te r -Day Saints. Appellant further states that 
at no J MII* did IN- ha\e any contact " ith employees or 
representatn rs ,.f Cooperative Secur.ty Corporation. 
This is not true. There were initial < nversations !.Mi 
Leonard Adams and Alfred W . C h r ^ m : however die 
person with whom Appellant negotiated was H e n r y D. 
Moyle. There is no evidence to show that H e n r y I ) , 
Movie was acting as a representative, agent r em-
ployee - - \spondent corporation. Although Henry 
D . J\I*>\ ie \* ;.\ ,: memher of the Firs t Presidency of the 
Chin ^ furing the entire period <•!* tim. .if negotiations, 
he was also the President of Cooperative Security Cor-
poration. (Exhibit A. m> 
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At no time has the Respondent corporation owned 
or held a leasehold interest in the property over which 
the alleged right-of-way was to have been granted. 
On June 18, 1959, Henry D. Moyle, as President of 
Cooperative Security Corporation, a Utah corporation, 
pursuant to a Resolution by the Board of Directors, filed 
an Application with the Bureau of Land Management 
of the United States Government to acquire a lease of 
the 640 acres through which the alleged right-of-way 
would have been granted. (Exhibit A, pg. 13). Subse-
quent thereto, on March 1, 1962, a lease was issued by 
the Bureau of Land Management to Cooperative Secur-
ity Corporation. (Exhibit A, pg. 18). Due to the fact 
that Respondent corporation has never held an interest 
in the property in question, nor contracted with Appel-
lant, there cannot be any breach of an alleged contract 
by the Respondent to convey an interest in the property. 
Appellant himself had adequate knowledge of the 
proper party to this action, and in no way was misled 
by Respondent. In a letter dated February 13, 1962 
Appellant was advised as follows: 
You are familiar with the fact that the Coopera-
tive Security Corporation recently obtained for 
the Deseret Coal Mine leases on two tracts of 
Government coal land. . . . (Emphasis Added.) 
(Exhibit A, pg. 19). 
On June 18, 1968 Appellant was advised in a letter 
that if a right-of-way were to be granted, it would be 
between himself and Cooperative Security Corporation. 
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1 I'h i c M i | . | * u \ n l c • !'• j ) a r l -SS i ' i ) l l o \ \ ' S = ~" I I l l s !'• It H | ) i \ 
!;• y-t'.y - t -( :»r l e t t e r a s k i n g fo r d e f i n i t i o n ,W --it/ht-nt-
way agreement that might be entered between yourself 
and Cooperative Security Corporation!' (Emphasis 
added) (Exhibit A. PIT :'0 •. 
Ii:i*s- a- answer !o Respondent's Interroga-
tors .V>. *j,s. altliough attempting to include *V Re 
spondent corporation, admits that the granting of the 
alleged right-of-way would have to be in fhr name of 
Cooperative Security Corporation. (R. ioh /// In-
terrogators Xn jft Ippellant further admits thai he 
wits nu an ,"/ tin jart H.^i Cooperative Security Corpo-
ration hail a leasehold interest in the subject property 
as early as December /,'. v.w, / R. ] r<* 
It i> InndanieiiUn thai where •. -<»rporation is the 
VK-I] [i; ri . ;o inures! a should he sued \v its corporate 
name. Article X I I , Section I « i (IK * la • Cor 
provides ill pari as' f'*1!'^  •• 
All corporations shall have lh« right to su<\ and 
shall be subject to be sued ; H •< urt- a K l e 
cases as natural persons. 
Section 16-10-k l"ui- i «MJC Annobth ,]. m">3. further 
provides that corporations enn Mir and lw -..ii-d MI Uicir 
corporate name. 
Cooperative Seenrif \ Corporation W.-JS incorporated 
in the State cf I ' tah u April 22. i**.*: uui .since that 
date has been authorized to do business in the State of 
I Jtah (Exhibit A - Page 21). As owner of the Wse-
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hold interest in the subject property, and by virtue of 
the fact that all negotiations concerning the alleged 
right-of-way were conducted with the President of 
said corporation, Cooperative Security Corporation is 
the proper defendant in this action, not the Corporation 
of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints. 
To contend, as does Appellant, that the President 
of the Church can control various entities and, there-
fore, become subject to suit for all such business trans-
actions, clearly ignores the laws of the State of Utah 
pertaining to corporations. To carry such assertion to 
the results desired by appellant would be to suggest 
that all suits involving the Deseret Book Company, 
Hotel Utah, Beneficial Life Insurance Company, Bon-
neville Interntaional, Cooperative Security Corpora-
tion, and many other church related corporations could 
be sued by suing the Corporation of the President. 
The lower court was, therefore, correct in holding 
that the lawsuit commenced by the Appellant was in 
fact commenced against the wrong party, and the grant-
ing of Summary Judgment on this ground was correct. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT CORRECTLY H E L D 
T H A T A P P E L L A N T ' S CAUSE OF ACTION 
IS B A R R E D BY T H E U T A H S T A T U T E OF 
L I M I T A T I O N S (SECTION 78-12-25, U T A H 
CODE A N N O T A T E D , 1953). 
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Section Jb 12 'J.*- I ta!s i ode Annoiaied. i:*V}, 
entitled "Within . years", establishing a four year 
Statute of l imitation j>'-o\id(»s in p o t a.s follows: 
An action no.a .[ r -en-aH, obligation ••• ;;amlity 
not founded upon ji ^ h u m e n t i n writing, . . , 
By virtue of !;.e fad that there is no instrument in 
writing establishing the agreement between the parties, 
the above-nKM11ioncd Statute ^ ! -imitations is con-
trol1 .,:•• 
ihr ea-'e of T. •••,! (Inntcc luntrh Cfnnf.Ht)!/-1 -v. 
Erickson, 82 Utaii 475, 25 P2d 952, (1933) the I ' n h 
Supreme Court held Hiaf an aelion for specific per-
formance of an oral contract or agreement to convey 
land which was commenced over live years after the 
execution of a deed was barred by the four year Statute 
of Limitation-. The Supreme (Our* further held iliat 
the cause of .leiion <-i a^li! n- MIC ar*-a (he moment an 
action may be maintained !•• enforce it, and thai 'lie 
Statute of Limitations is then set in motion. See also 
State Taoc Commission vs. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 
100 P2(I 575. ! 1940), and (T//e/V w h'-nivalis. 2l\ T>ah 
2d 355, tori lK2d 799 MO* 
Appellant admits m JJIS Aiesvvej i -u>ponucnt s 
Interrogatories No. 7 that the contract. >r oI)iigatiou In 
provide a right-of-wa;. first came into existence on 
March ! . !'*<•; *j. the* dale tin- l e^e »\.-.-, obtained from 
the Bureau f ! .oid Managemcnl. <'• ? ;a! d.;te ( o 
operative Security Corporation was JM a position it r 
•< Hi-st time to grant a H<jaV-°f v^a\ n> Appellant •!' 
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in fact an obligation so to do existed. According to the 
foregoing cases, a cause of action therefore arose on 
March 1, 1962, and a four year Statute of Limitations 
was then set in motion. This cause of action was in-
itiated by the Appellant by the service of a summons 
upon the Respondent on April 12, 1972. This is in 
excess of 10 years following the commencement of the 
cause of action and the start of the running of the 
Statute of Limitations. Therefore under any theory or 
under any Statute of Limitations, Appellant's cause 
of action would be barred. 
Appellant admits in answer to Respondent's In-
terrogatory No. 14 that Respondent's failure to per-
form the contract took place on December 9, 1966 
when Respondent through Cooperative Security Cor-
poration entered into a lease or option agreement with 
Peabody Coal Company and failed in said agreement 
to reserve the right-of-way for Appellant's use. Ap-
pellant also states in answer to Respondent's Inter-
rogatory No. 13 that his first demand for performance 
was made by letter on February 16, 1967. (R. 102) 
In response to Respondent's Interrogatory No. 16, 
requesting the date the Appellant claims that a cause 
of action arose against the Respondent the Appellant 
stated as follows: 
On March 17, 1967 by virtue of a letter from 
Wilford W. Kirton, Jr., counsel for Defendant 
addressed to plaintiff denying any obligation or 
arrangement on behalf of defendant to provide 
plaintiff the right-of-way. 
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The courL can a«/ctpi ;o \ -t tin .i.'Us relied ;:poii 
by the Appellant as the chile lhe WIUM ol ;ietion arose, 
and the same is still barred I >;. ?ir H \<;U- Malute 
of Limitations, as provided f <h ^eeihm ?^-L'-:V), 
Uhih Code Annotated. i(.*v; 
\ppell;in\ :i: Ins Hric-f. ]i;is attempted f ; * laim 
that the Respondent is precluded from asserting a 
defense of the Statute of Limitations on the ground 
that there existed a fiduciary or confidential relationship 
between the parties. Appellant failed to assert the 
claim of ;. confidential relationship at the time of the 
taking of Ins depositor or at the lime of answering the 
Interrogatories. It w>idd appear a*- Miongh the Ap-
pellant \< now attempting to assert a nrw defense in 
order to combat the obvious running of the Statute 
of Limitaations. A further treatment of the argument 
concerning the fiduciary relationship •* -:t K- i ' ," , i , ' " | 
in Point I I I of our Brief. 
i ML io\\cr court \.u. »*niiii MI i* i..inii; uuit the 
foor '.ear Statute of Limitations controlled and the ac-
tion by the Appellant is therefore barred. 
P O I N ' i 
A . \ i i i u i L i i U i i liJLJL^v i I O N S H I P , L u N -
S T R U C T I V E T R U S T , O R R E L I A N C E U P O N 
I N T K K N A L C H U R C H G R I E V A N C E PI? .OCE-
D U K E S C E A S E D T O E X I S T M O R E 1 T I IA N 
FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCE-
MENT nv T H I S ACTION, AND THERETO!* Iv 
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R E S P O N D E N T IS NOT E S T O P P E D F R O M 
A S S E R T I N G A D E F E N S E OF S T A T U T E OF 
L I M I T A T I O N S . 
A review of the correspondence will show that 
during the period immediately following the convey-
ance of the property by the Respondent to Peabody 
Coal Company that any alleged fiduciary relationship; 
right to rely upon a constructive trust; utilization of 
internal grievance procedures; or the right to rely upon 
conduct of the Respondent constituting an estoppel 
ceased and terminated. 
A series of letters show that legal procedures, not 
church procedures, were resorted to. 
On August 23, 1967 in a letter from Appellant 
to President Tanner of the First Presidency of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, attention 
is called to the fact that the letter was prepared at the 
request of legal counsel for the Church and sent to 
the Appellant's legal counsel. (Exhibit A - Page 23). 
On September 14, 1967, Appellant was advised that 
all future requests or negotiations would be handled 
by legal counsel for the church. (Exhibit A - Page 24). 
In his response, Appellant, on September 21, 1967 
stated that all future negotiations would be presented 
to the Church's legal counsel. (Exhibit A - Page 25). 
This correspondence clearly shows that the parties were 
proceeding through normal, legal channels and utilizing 
legal counsel rather than relying upon the special fidu-
ciary relationship existing between the parties. 
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In a letter dated October 10, 1967 to Mr. Kirton, 
legal counsel to the Church, Appellant, after complain-
ing about the conduct of the Church as it applied to 
him, stated as follows: 
I feel that the treatment I have recently received, 
after working closely in the past with the Church 
for many years in connection with coal-mining 
and coal-lands, is definitely wrong. It is my opin-
ion that I have not only been used for the 
Church's benefit, but I have been betrayed out-
right. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit A, pg. 28). 
By November 9, 1967, the Appellant apparently 
recognizing that his personal requests had been refused, 
made a personal appeal to President Tanner for a 
meeting with him, stating that the lowest type of crimi-
nals are given a chance to be heard. H e further stated: 
I t seems to me that you have closed all doors, but 
I am asking you one more time; can you not meet 
with me personally and try to arbitrate this mat-
ter harmoniously together? (Exhibit A, pg. 29). 
President Tanner responded that he would be willing 
to meet with Appellant but further stated in his letter 
of November 14, 1967 as follows: 
Having arranged for Brother Wilford W. Kir-
ton, our legal counsel, to discuss the matter with 
you, I was of the opinion that you had been given 
a hearing and his explanation of your requests 
was such as to make it impossible for us to meet 
them. (Exhibit A, pg. 30). 
The meeting was apparently held but not to the satis-
faction of the Appellant. On February 6, 1968, the 
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Appellant wrote a letter to the Bureau of Land Man-
agement, in essence "turning Respondent in" for 
alleged misconduct in securing the leases. In the letter 
the Appellant stated: 
I hereby file a formal protest against the L.D.S. 
Church assigning, selling, sub-letting, or altering 
the ownership or right to operate and produce 
coal. . . from designated leases. (Exhibit A, pg. 
31). 
On February 27, 1968 Appellant once again com-
plained about the improper treatment received by him, 
and then, in no uncertain terms, makes it clear that 
he was no longer placing any trust in representatives 
of the Respondent. The letter in part states as follows: 
. . . I am now of the opinion that the Church was 
intending to sell their coal-lands to Peabody, as 
far back as this, and were just using me to help 
the matter along. . . . 
I t seems strange that the death of so few could 
change the policy of the Church so much. 
. . . but in each case received a rebuff and was 
treated as though I were trying to use the Church 
for my own benefit. 
Instead of me using the Church, it seems the 
Church used and deceived me, and then, in the 
end, secretly betrayed me altogether. (Emphasis 
Added.) (Exhibit A, pg. 37). 
On March 15, 1968, counsel for the Church replied 
to the Appellant's preceding letter by stating: 
I think it is very unfortunate that you believe the 
Church used and deceived you and secretly be-
trayed you altogether. . . . 
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Beyond this, The First Presidency have conclud-
ed and I am under instructions to inform you that 
it has no moral obligation to you and is unable to 
grant your request. (Exhibit A, pg. 40). 
All of the foregoing correspondence took place 
more than four years prior to the commencement of 
this action. The foregoing establishes hostility on behalf 
of the Appellant and completely obliterates any claim 
that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed 
subsequent to that date. These letters show that the 
Appellant was advised, and accepted the direction that 
all negotiations would be through legal counsel rather 
than Church grievance procedures. The Appellant 
was advised and understood that his claim was not 
being recognized. He therefore made further appeals 
for reconsideration. H e finally concluded to take formal 
action by filing a protest with the Bureau of Land 
Management. Under such circumstances, and conduct, 
it is inconceivable how Appellant could claim conduct 
on behalf of the Respondent constituting an estoppel. 
Nor could he any longer contend that Respondent was 
recognizing his claim, thus constituting a constructive 
trust. 
The Appellant in his letters acknowledges that he 
was on notice that his claim had been denied by Re-
spondent at a time more than four years before com-
mencement of this lawsuit. Thus, adopting a theory per-
taining to the Statute of Limitations most liberal to the 
Appellant, the action is still barred. 
The Affidavit of the Appellant to the effect that 
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he believed he was dealing with "a direct representative 
of God" and for Appellant to question such agents 
"would be heresy" can hardly be classified as an affi-
davit of facts as required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rather, it appears to be statements of con-
clusions and afterthought statements of the Appellant's 
mental attitude at the time. There is no reference in 
the affidavit to any facts sustaining the conclusions now 
asserted by the Appellant. 
Likewise, the Appellant failed to assert the claim 
of a confidential relationship at the time of the taking 
of his deposition and in answer to interrogatories con-
cerning any defense to the Statute of Frauds or Statute 
of Limitations. 
The actual conduct of Appellant shows that he 
openly and critically challenged representatives of the 
church and further threatened to expose such "agents of 
diety,. This conduct is far more persuasive than belated 
self-serving statements in his affidavit. 
In a letter dated July 30,1968 to President Tanner 
the Appellant made it clear that he considered any fur-
ther compromise negotiations at a close and stated that 
he intended to seek relief in the courts. Part of that 
letter is as follows: 
The Church has severely damaged me, and those 
of you who are presently in control of the Church 
seem to lack the qualities advocated by the Church 
to settle this on a moral basis even though, in my 
opinion, it puts the Church in a position of being 
guilty of preaching one thing and yet practicing 
another. 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I have tried for nearly 18 months to get this mat-
ter settled in a fair and amicable way, but all you 
have done from the beginning, in my opinion, is 
to try to find a way out without making a fair 
settlement, regardless of the damage you have 
done to me. 
I have been in business for myself for approxi-
mately 38 years, and to the best of my recollection 
I have never been treated so shabbily. 
In view of all that has transpired I consider that 
you have left me no alternative but to seek relief 
in the courts. So, unless you can come up with 
something that is more realistic and of some value 
to me, I herewith advise you that my next move 
will be to file an action in court, to try and recover 
damages. (Emphasis Added.) (Exhibit A, pg. 
46). 
A short time later the Appellant delivered a letter 
to th eEditor of the Salt Lake Tribune, Mr. Will Fehr, 
asking the letter be published as a news item, exposing 
the Church and its officers. On August 19, 1968, the 
Appellant wrote to Mr. A. C. Deck, Executive Editor 
of the Tribune, calling attention that the letter had 
been delivered to Mr. Fehr and again requesting that 
the letter be published as a news item. If the paper 
were unwilling to publish it, the Appellant then stated 
that he was willing to pay for it to be published by any 
department or whatever section of the paper for which 
it would qualify. H e concluded his letter as follows: 
I will appreciate your giving this you attention as 
soon as conveniently possible, because I intend to 
see to it that this matter is brought before the at-
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tention of the public by whatever means I find 
necessary. (Exhibit A, pg. 47). 
On August 26, 1968 Appellant wrote to J . W. 
Gallivan, Publisher, Salt Lake Tribune, in which he 
stated as follows: 
I also wonder if you fully realize what conse-
quences could develop as a result of your refusal 
to publish this letter. 
In my opinion, this letter covers points of utmost 
importance to most members of the L.D.S. 
Church, and it is also my opinion that the mem-
bers of the Church should be made aware of how 
matters of this nature are presently being han-
dled. (Exhibit A, pg. 48). 
Such conduct by Appellant clearly demonstrates 
that his belated Affidavit is a sham. Obviously, there 
existed no fiduciary, or other confidential relationship 
between the parties which would estop the Respondent 
from asserting a defense of the Statute of Limitations. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E L O W E R COURT W A S CORRECT I N 
G R A N T I N G R E S P O N D E N T ' S MOTION F O R 
SUMMARY J U D G M E N T ON T H E G R O U N D 
T H A T T H E ISSUE O F D A M A G E S W A S 
E I T H E R MOOT OR N O T S U S C E P T I B L E TO 
L E G A L D E T E R M I N A T I O N . 
I t is clearly proper and within the discretion of 
the lower court to rule on an issue of mootness as a 
matter of law. 
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Appellant contends that it was improper for the 
lower court to rule on the issue of damages, claiming 
that it is "within the province of the jury" to decide 
matters of fact relating to the assessment of damages. 
However true this may be generally, in the case before 
the court, the issue is not the authority of the lower 
court to assess and rule on the actual amount of dam-
ages, but rather, the authority of the lower court to 
rule, as a matter of law, as to whether the Appellant 
has a justifiable cause of action for damages. 
I t is settled law that it is the duty of every judicial 
tribunal to decide actual controversies by a judgment 
which can be carried into effect. Paul v. Milk Depots* 
Inc., 41 Cal Rptr 468, 396 P2d 924 (1964). This pre-
cludes the court having to rule on moot questions of 
law or fact which ultimately have no practical effect 
in settling the litigant's rights. ..Smith v. Smith, 304 
P2d 421 (Ore., 1956). 
In the recent case of Kellch v. Westland Minerals 
Corp., 26 Utah 2d 42, 484 P2d 726 (1971), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where the Court was unable 
to effect the rights of the parties the issue was moot 
and therefore the appeal was dismissed. 
In the instant case, as in Kellch, supra., both the 
Appellant and Respondent have disposed of the prop-
erty in question to Peabody Coal Company. Initially, 
Cooperative Security Corporation conveyed an option 
to Peabody Coal Company. Thereafter the Appellant 
leased his adjacent property to Peabody Coal Company 
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on a 30 year lease, where Appellant is to receive at 
least the sum of $540,000. The presence or absence 
of the alleged right-of-way became insignificant, in-
asmuch as Peabody Coal Company would then own 
not only the property containing the fault, but also the 
property over which the alleged right-of-way was to 
have run. 
Had the Appellant received less money from Pea-
body Coal Company by virtue of the fact that he was 
unable to provide the alleged right-of-way over the 
property, he would then have had a clear issue of 
damages, which properly should have gone to the jury. 
By the Appellant's own admissions, the presence or 
absence of the right-of-way had no effect on the price 
he ultimately received upon the lease of the property. 
On Page 76 of Appellant's Deposition we read in part 
as follows: 
Q. Was there any adjustment in the price in the 
ultimate deal made with Peabody by virtue of the 
fault problem that is the subject matter of this 
lawsuit? 
A. No. 
Q. There was none? 
A. (indicating affirmatively). 
By Appellant's own admission, and by virtue of 
his having leased his property for a substantial sum of 
money " . . . without any diminution in price to the 
owner of the property through which the alleged right-
of-way was to be granted, makes the issue of damages 
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either moot or not susceptible to legal determination." 
(Amended Order - Page 10). For this reason the lower 
court was correct in granting Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Another reason why the issue of damages is moot 
is because the entire contract is conditional. If the fault 
were found to extend into the federal land, then, and 
only then was a right-of-way to be used. On pages 40 
and 41 of Appellant's Deposition, Appellant admitted 
that ". . . if the faults extended into your property, I 
could go into your property far enough with my entries 
to go around the end of the fault." (Emphasis Added) 
In answer to Respondent's Interrogatories No. 8 and 
10, Appellant admits that the granting of the right-of-
way was conditional. (R. 100 and 101). As of the date 
the Appellants Deposition was taken, he had no knowl-
edge as to whether or not the fault did in fact extend into 
the federal property. (McKinnon Deposition, pg. 33 
and 37). 
Section 251 of the Restatement of Contracts pro-
vides in part as follows: 
(1) Performance of a duty subject to a condi-
tion cannot become due unless the condition 
occurs or is excused. 
(2) If the condition has not been excused, its 
nonoccurrence discharges the duty where the 
condition can no longer occur. 
As of the time the Appellant entered into his agree-
ment with Peabody Coal Company, it had not been 
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determined that the fault did, in fact, extend into such 
property. Since there has been no occurrence of the 
condition precedent, or any assurance that the condition 
will ever be fulfilled there is no way of assessing dam-
ages, if any, which Appellant would have suffered. 
Accordingly, the lower court was correct in holding 
that the question of damages was moot, and not sus-
ceptable to legal determination. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has clearly presented to this Court a 
detailed analysis of the law concerning the points raised 
by Respondent in the lower court in support of its Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment. An examination of the 
various exhibits, and the record before this Court give 
ample justification for affirming the decision of the 
lower court in granting Respondent's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on the following grounds: 
1. The action was commenced against an improper 
Defendant. 
2. The cause of action is barred by the Utah Statute 
of Limitations (Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953). 
3. The fact that the Plaintiff having leased his prop-
erty without any diminution in price to the owner of the 
property through which the alleged right-of-way was to 
be granted, makes the issue of damages either moot or 
not susceptible to legal determination. 
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Respondent further asserts that the lower court 
was correct in refusing to allow the Appellant to amend 
his complaint by substituting or including new parties 
defendant, and by adding a new cause of action. By vir-
tue of the fact that the cause of action itself is barred by 
the Statute of Limitations and Statute of Frauds, per-
mitting Appellant to sue a different party would be of 
no effect. 
Respondent respectfully submits that this Court, 
based on the facts and authorities presented in Re-
spondent's Cross-Appeal, should rule that Respondent 
was also entitled to a Summary Judgment on the 
grounds that the preliminary negotiations between the 
parties did not create a binding contract, and that the 
alleged contract is void for failure to comply with the 
Utah Statute of Frauds. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wilford W. Kirton, J r . 
Dan S. Bushnell 
Richard R. Neslen 
of and for 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER 
& B O Y L E 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, 
Cross-Appellant 
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